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Intergovernmental Revenue Assignment and Mobilization
Principles and Applications for Somalia

Introduction: Purpose and Scope
The World Bank’ s report on Somalia Economic Update/Special Focus on Intergovernmental Relations
concludes that although Somalis face a daunting and long term development challenge to overcome two
decades of conflict and fragility, with a commitment of a new government substantial progress is being
made to support a potentially vibrant private sector economy, improve human and economic
development outcomes, and prioritize the establishment of intergovernmental (central and member
government) institutions for effective macro-fiscal management (World Bank, 2015).
A dimension of importance to achievement of these broad reform objectives is to now “focus on (and
to) … facilitate on- going negotiations(s)… for a way forward rather than finding a final fiscal
arrangement”(World Bank, 2015). This perspective a setting a knowledge base for “a way forward” is the
same advice that Janos Kornai made during the 1990s transition of Central and Eastern European
countries from a demonstrably poor and slow growth command-and control economy to one liberalized
markets and public sector reform— that “a change of government is not a change of system, merely one
of the pre-conditions for it”…and that, the “change of system is an historical process that seems likely to
require a long period of time”. (Kornai, 1992). The World Bank 2015 report notes that the reform of public
institutions take 20 years even in the fastest-of reforming economies.
Such a timeframe for setting the pre-conditions for a sustainable public sector is not a counsel for delay.
Indeed today’s Somalia faces a set of circumstances that have sim ilarities other now well-established
and effective federal states. There are four such sim ilarities. The first is these countries had features of
“bottom-up” federalism whereby the member states had to learn to collaborate --a collaboration often
characterized by a high degree of tension—to create a functioning central state (e.g., Australia, Canada,
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Switzerland, and United States). 1 An important aspect of a “bottom up” system is that the from the start
of the reform process the subnational governments that come together to create a federal system bring
with them a revenue culture of decentralized fiscal autonomy and capacity that pays-off over the decades
in terms of fiscal sustainability and economic development. I n contrast, many historically centralized
states find “top down” fiscal culture that becomes an obstacle to achieving public sector reform —an
obstacle that is becoming more evident in an era of the globalization, (World Bank, WDR, 1999-2000, pg.
31-33l; Congleton, 2006.). For the Somalia, the fact that its once and potentially future federal member
states (FMS) of Somaliland and Puntland are, at present, more public administration capable that the
federal government of Somali (FGS) can be seen as nation-building advantage. 2
Second, societies that have been and remain fragmented in the sense of having a “territorial based
groups of people who are or who consider themselves to be, distinct in one or more features such as
ethnicity, religion, language, and, or history, ancient or recent”, the sorting out of power and wealth
sharing arrangements has become a “glue” for creating a nation state (e.g., Belgium, Canada, Germany,
India, Indonesia, People’ s Republic of China, Philippines, Spain). 3
Third, after an era of conflict warring parties have been able to settle on a set of principles that allow for
an “effective” state in terms not only to how efficiently and equitably provide public services, but also
how a the various aspects of a country’s public finances are structured (e.g., I ndonesia. Northern I reland,
Switzerland). 4
A fourth sim ilarity for today’ s Somalia is that is far from alone in now making an effort to overcome an
history of conflict and colonialism in order to become an “own functioning” society.5 Federalism is
aways a work in progress. (Watts, 2008).
From Fragility to a Functional Federalism: The Case for Being Intergovernmental

1

And, all four now federally mature countries have experienced periods of conflict. As Linder discusses, it would
be “fundamentally wrong” to think of Switzerland as a country without historical conflicts. Switzerland is a country
created by different ethnic groups speaking different languages and following different religions and thus having
to deal with processes of nation-building that in many ways are :comparable with processes in developing
countries today (Linder,1994). For the US, the 1861-65 Civil War (War Between the Confederate and Federal
States) was a “.defining event” that far more than the war for independence (1775-1783) from Great Britain
consolidated a nation politically, economically, and ideologically (Hummel, 2007). Canada, which was founded in
1867as a centralized federation (but since then has become highly decentralized), had its conflicts (notably the Rebellions
of 1837-1837 of Upper vs. Lower Canada). During 1922-1926 an Australian Civil War (1922-1926) was a war fought between
the Republic of Australia and the self- declared Queensland Republic (for an overview of Australian federalism see Saunders,
2005 and World Bank, 2015)
2

FGS: federal government of Somalia. FMS: federal member state.
Bird and Viallancourt, xxxx; Zahar ccc
4
For a review of the role played as a strategy for nation /peace building in conflict affected states see Bird and Ebel
(2007) Bird, Vaillancourt, and Roy-Cesar (2010), Zahar (2013) and, specifically for Somalia, Ross (September 2014).
5
Watts (2008); UNECA (2010); Ross (2014)
3

The working prem ise of this Briefing Note is that there is a ready willingness of Somalis to explore the
transition from a “fragile state” to that of a functioning federal nation-state; that is, a system of
governance whereby an agreed upon Constitution provides for a “coming together” in an alliance of
constituent (member) governments, each of which recognize the legitimacy of a central government on
some matters once exclusively the responsibility of the individual member states. 6 (Provisional
Constitution, Article 50). Federalism is a system of voluntary agreement upon (i) a set of shared rules
as well as (ii) areas for self-rule whereby each constituent unit recognizes the merits of the of a system of
intergovernmental cooperation but at the same time remains politically accountable to its own
electorate (Provisional Constitution, Article 50). 7, 8
To accomplish this coming-together objective, a task for today’ s Somali task is to engage in a dialogue of
the principles and practices of the sorting out of the fiscal roles among the Federal Government of
Somalia its member states, sub-state governments, and, likely at some point in the process, creating
regional governments and multi-state compacts. 9. 10
And, there is a good case for getting this set of intergovernmental arrangement right. As the public
finance literature attests, a well- designed, well implemented system of intergovernmental fiscal
arrangements can lead to improved efficiency in the utilization of a society’ s limited resources of land,
labor, capital and entrepreneurship; increases in the level and effectiveness of the delivery of public
services, and, as a result of the convergence of these two factors, enhanced macro-stabilization and
economic growth (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2004; Boadway and Shah, 2015)
To be c lear, however, for a society to realize these potential payoffs much –a great deal—depends on the
design and capacity of the intergovernmental institutions, a design that what may work for one

6

In some federations constitutions are explicit that there is no fiscal hierarchy among certain types of
governments (e.g., Australia, Canada, India, Pakistan, Switzerland, and the United states).
Others are
constitutionally federal but in which there is a hierarchical (unitary) element whereby the central government is, as
Shah describes, “at the apex” of the intergovernmental arrangement. Bird (Cuba Notes, 2005) makes the distinction
between “loose” (Canada, Switzerland, United States, and “tight” Ethiopia, Germany, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia)
federal systems. Present day Somalia is difficult to categorize. It is a nascent system of “bottom up” federalism,
thus, “loose”, and likely to remain so for some time.
7
Federalism is typically presented as in the middle of a continuum between that of a unitary and con -federate
arrangement (Bird, 2005; Watts, 2008; World Bank, 2015). A unitary system is one in which the central government
as the constitutionally bestowed authority to determine what political powers are assigned to ”their” sub-central
units, but also whether or create, abolish, or change the boundaries of the sub-central jurisdiction. Examples abound
(Muwonge and Ebel, 2014). A confederation is a system in which a politically and fiscally weak central government
serves and an agent of the member units which have significant spending or taxing lowers (Shah, 2007; Fox and
Wallich, 2007).
8
Bird, 2005
9
At present, a political map of Somalis will show eighteen (18) administrative divisions, which the World Bank report
presents as regions (World Bank, 2015, Table 8.4). The Provisional constitution (2012 ,Article 48) states that no
single region can stand alone as a government, as until such time as a region merges with another region(s) to form
a new Federal Member State (FMS), a region shall be directly administered by the Federal government for a
maximum of two years. It is not clear what a regions formal fiscal role is if its residents do not join a member state.
10
The topic creating joint service delivery districts will not be addressed in this report; but the principles laid out
herein can be applied in a subsequent report the pros and cons of general vs. special purpose governments.
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intergovernmental system may not be right for another. 11 And, to add to the discussion, there is also
research that concludes that within a nation-state, the sorting out of intergovernmental roles and
responsibilities among governments may be asymmetric. Thus, some countries with a federal form of
governance have come to a cooperative agreement that for purposes of overall efficiency enhancing and
political solidarity there is merit in giving some constituent units flexibility in accommodating different
needs. These differences may be spatial (e.g., in terms of natural resource endowment, geography, size
of the unit), economic (e.g., rural vs, urban), and/or social and cultural (language, ethnicity. religion). 12
For purposes of this discussion, two key points emerge. The first is that for intergovernmental system to
be capable—to function in a sustainable way—there is a set of fundamental principles that apply to all
intergovernmental (and in Somali’ s case, a federal) society that are then adapted locally. As Bird (2005)
puts it: universal principles with local applications.
The second is that for federalism to “work” both the central governments and the fiscally sovereign
member states must become develop the intergovernmental capacity generate revenues in order to pay
for public goods. 13
Four Fundamental Questions
There are four fundamental questions facing any intergovernmental society (Bird, 1996).


Expenditure Assignment. Which type of government, central and local, delivers which set of
public sector services?



Revenue Assignment. Which revenues are most appropriate for use by which type of
government?



Intergovernmental Financial Transfers. How can fiscal imbalances among the federation’ s
constituent units be resolved when one learns that the amount Somali shillings (dollar, birr,
franc, pound, rand, renminbi, rand…) required to satisfy the expenditure and revenue
assignment amounts do not add up to the same number. And,



11

Borrowing and Debt Management. How shall the tim ing of receipts for financing the public’ s
capital be structured and monitored?

Bird, Ebel, Wallich, 1995; Brinkerhoff and Johnson, 2009; Yilmaz, Vaillancourt and Dafflon, 2012; A recent and
thorough review of the literature is provided by Martinez-Vazquez, Lago-Penas, and Sacchi, 2015).
12
Congleton, 2006; Bird, Vaillancourt, and Roy-Cesar (2010)
13
There are three aspects to capacity building: (i) addressing the four fundamental questions listed below
(organizational capacity); (ii) developing a set of governmental agencies and instrumentalities accompanied by a
clear and transparent set of enabling rules and regulations for their operation (institutional capacity), and (iii)
developing a knowledge base and system of learning so that individuals can make the first two forms of capacity
effective (individual capacity).

To list these four core questions is the starting point for organizing the pre-conditions for Somali public
sector reform. The next task is to work through them in a manner that reflects Somalia’ s special social,
geographical, historical and political circumstances (World Bank, 2015, p37). And, although no single
set of rules of how and in what form its federal system will evolve, as time passes a set policy options,
and the tradeoffs among them, will emerge that require Somali policymakers and practitioners to
continually research and evaluate how specific revenue arrangements in one era may need to be
adjusted in another era in order to “fit” Somalia’ s changing econom ic, demographic, institutional and
technological trends –that is, fits its “fiscal architecture”. (Wallace, 2003; World Bank, 2015) But, even
with such changes overtime, the principles of federalism, and with that, the four fundamental
questions will not change. Indeed, one of the most important merits of a well-designed and wellimplemented federal system is that it is a system that accommodates a nation’ s changing fiscal
architecture. (Martinez-Vazquez and Vaillancourt, 2014)

Organization of the Remainder of This Briefing Note
The focus of this Briefing Note is on second of the four core questions of intergovernmental finance-- the
process of sorting out revenue authority and responsibility between the central government (the Federal
Government of Somalia, FGS) and its and subnational (state, regional, district, municipal/SNG )
partners. 14, 15 As will be discussed below, some revenues assigned may be exclusive to the FSG, while
others will be reserved for the member states and their local governments; and still other types of revenue
will be concurrent in their application.. The purpose of this Note is to lay out the framework—a way of
thinking- of how this all gets worked out. The payoff to getting the assignment question right will go
a long way to allowing Somalia to seize upon what many view as a present turning point from that of a
fragile to a functioning state. (World Bank, 2015, p 38-39; ICG, February 2017).
This Briefing Note is organized in what can be labeled a “stylized sequence”. The reference here to
“stylized” is made because the reality is that rather than be a smooth step-by-step sequence, the practice
of the intergovernmental reform process and its outcome will be framed and, in some cases constrained,
by the pace at which Somalia’ s different types of governments develop their organizational,
institutional, and bureaucratic capacity (Thomas, 2006; OECD DAC, 2016); World Bank, 2015). The uneven
nature how this sequence flows is reinforced in the case of Somalia due to what the World Bank (2015)
refers to as the “state of state formation” –that is how overtime the nascent Federal government of

14

Throughout this Briefing Note the state/local/regional/local… types of government may be referred to subnational
governments, or SNGs.
15
The first of the four questions, that of Expenditure Assignment has been adequately addressed by elsewhere (for
Somalia, by Peteri, 2017), as have the topics on Intergovernmental Transfers and Borrowing and Debt Indeed, there
is a large, yet due to data limitations, still more developing than robust, literature on all these topics. For reviews
with an African focus see Yatta and Vaillancourt (2010), Yilmaz and Tosun (xxxx), and Negussie/.HESPI (2016)
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Somalia (FGS) and its Federal Member States (FMSs) work together to create an era of cooperativefederalism (World Bank, 2015, Sec 7.4). 16

Schematically, the organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows:
<Fundamentals of Revenue Assignment>
the policy asymmetry of c losed vs. open economies →
finance follows function: establish a willingness to pay taxes and fees→
from broad principles to local applications →
theory of the public budget →
the normative of “ who should pay” taxes and fees?→
how this normative is further shaped by spatial considerations→
the revenue assignment matrix of which type of government
is best positioned to utilize different types of revenues→
which type of government administers own revenues?

Universal Principles: The Preliminaries
To set the stage for sequencing revenue reform, the following two “preliminaries” must be considered: (i)
revenue classification terminology; and (ii) the rationale for why the two assignment questions are taken in
sequence whereby “finance (revenue authority) follows function (expenditure responsibility).”
Terminology
Getting “revenue assignment” right requires getting clarity on some on terminology. There are three
terminology topics to be highlighted in addressing the revenue assignment question: (i) different types of
revenues and the distinction between a revenue and receipt; (ii) being explicit as to the definition of a local
revenue; and (iii) why the Somali task is one of sorting out as distinct from assigning revenue authority
among governments.
Tax vs. Non-Tax Revenue.
As an abstract economic matter, the distinction between” “tax” and “non-tax: revenue is not much of a
concern. Both refer to the setting of a revenue “price” (also referred to as a “tax cost”) for the delivery of
a set of public services.

16

The World Bank identifies seven geographical groupings that might serve as part of an informal process of
minimizing conflicts over state boundaries and the composition of interim FMS administrations. World Bank
(2015), Sec 7.4. The seven are Somaliland, Puntland, Interim Juba Administration (the regions of Gedo, Lower
Jubba, Middle Juba); Interim South West Administration (Bay, Bakool, Lower Shabelle), Interim Galmudug
Administration (South Mudug and Galgaduud), Hiiran and Middle Shebelle, and, the Benadir Region.

However, in matters of accounting —for example, in developing a Somalia Census of Government
Finances—one must be careful to not use terms “tax” and “revenue” interchangeably.
Here, there are two considerations. First, mixing up the terms may have implications for whether the
amounts collected from certain types of revenue are subject to legally imposed limitations. Thus, in some
countries and/or member states there is a constitutional or statutory limit on the amount of a tax that can
be collected and/or on the tax rate that a government can impose. For example, in Benin, local governments
may determine property tax rates subject to a minimum and maximum range that has been determined by
the Parliament. (Vaillancourt and Yatta, 2010, p.36).
One response by a government that is so constrained, is to replace a tax with a non-tax revenue. For
example, consider the local government that that faces a limitation on the amount of property taxes it can
generate; and at the same time still needs to provide road maintenance services. If the funds for paying for
this service are paid out of property tax revenues that are subject to a levy limit, the funds may be
insufficient to pay for the required repairs. If, however, the funding is derived from a nontax revenue
such as a “right-of-way fee” assessed on land and building that front on the streets, then the tax limitation
is circumvented.
Second, getting the terminology right at the outset will permit a meaningful comparison of Somali’s
intergovernmental finances to that of other nation states. What is a “tax revenue” in one country may be
classified as a “non-tax revenue” in another. The payments for the use of heating and lighting utilities
provide a good example. Some governments classify the payments as a “utility tax”; others may classify
the very same payment as a “utility charge”. 17
A tax is a required -by-law compulsory payment to a government in order to finance the provision of
government services. (Bird, 1976; Thuronyi, 2005). Names for taxes are excise, impost, cess, levy, and, in
the case of international trade flows, customs duties and tariffs.
A tax may be “general” or ‘specific”. A general tax it is a payment made without reference to any specific
benefits derived from government spending. The most common examples are the levies on personal income,
retail sales, and general business activities measured by the gross sales (receipts), profits (“company tax”),
and/or value added of a business enterprise.
Then there are “specific” levies, again compulsory, on a person or group of people assumed to be the
primary beneficiaries of certain public services. Examples include levies the use of utility services, the
purchase of motor vehicle fuels and “selective sales/excise” taxes sales on “things’ such as food purchased
in restaurants, luxury goods, amusements, and hotel accommodations. Too, a specific tax may levied on a
products or activity that, though legal, society wishes discourage such as the use of alcohol. And as in
Kenya, specific taxes products such as tobacco or khat that exhibit a price inelasticity of demand whereby
the quantity of the product used is not much reduced by the imposition of special tax with the result that it
becomes a reliable revenue producer. 18

17

The classification of government imposed charges for the flow of utility services tax in South Africa and as a fee
in the United States.
18
Technically: the increase in the percentage change in the specific tax is less that the percentage change in the
reduced quantity demanded of the product. Thus, total revenue increases even though the quantity demanded of
the taxed product decreases.
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A non-tax revenue –that is, a payment structured as a user fee or charge— is a payment to a government
for which there is an explicit quid-pro-quo for a service received. Some user fees and charges are clearly
voluntary payments—e.g., such as a sum of money paid by an individual who chooses to access a public
museum, recreational facility, or game park or motor vehicle parking space; but, many fees and charges
are compulsory.
With respect to the set of compulsory non-tax revenues, there are two categories: regulatory charges
and infrastructure charges and fees levied for the purpose of financing the capital construction, and, once
that infrastructure stock is in place, financing the maintenance and operations to pay for the continuing flow
of infrastructure services (Bird and Slack, 2017).


Regulatory fees, which may be central or state/ local tend are typically place-of- service specific.
In nearly all these cases those who pay for the service and be readily matched to those who use
a service being supplied. Examples include: payments for documentary services such as land
registration, marriage and birth registration, and passport issuance along with charges for market
stall rental, slaughterhouse/abattoir use, livestock grazing rights, food inspection, and advertising
on public properties. .



In contrast to such regulatory fees, charges and in support of paying for cost of the public
infrastructure services often have “polycentric” character
since infrastructure (e.g., roads,
bridges, ferries, sewer and sanitation systems, solid waste disposal facilities, water and ports,
inland waterways, hospitals and health clinics, schools, on-street parking spaces and parking
garages, facilities, game parks, publicly assisted housing) will be shared by/flow across the
boundaries of government jurisdictions.
Financing the Capital Stock. In this case of paying for infrastructure, charges and fees may be
earmarked either for financing new or improvements to the capital stock, or for funding the current
flow of infrastructure services. Although as countries become more developed most of the capital
financing of infrastructure is secured through the use of debt finance (e.g., Johannesburg, 20042010; Lagos, 2008-2010; Ouagadougou, 2006), there is also role for some user charge financing
such as that of a (i) special assessment fees for publicly provides services charged to the property
owners who live on-site along the infrastructure service (e.g., betterment levies for a city
sidewalk) and (ii) and “exactions” and “impact fees” levied on developers of an infrastructure
project in order to help defray the cost of nearby, but off-the-development site, infrastructure that
the public would otherwise have to finance (e.g., a “feeder road” that provides access to a
privately develop power plant or charge for using the public right-of-way to install a private
telecommunications cable network). 19
Funding the Service Flow. The primary role of user charges in developed and developing
economies alike is that of funding current flow of infrastructure services—e.g. for roads and
highways (e.g., tolls, fees or taxes on motor fuel, and in some cases, motor vehicle licensing for
both the vehicle and the driver); utilities (amount of the utility output used, and,
the
aforementioned use of a public right-of way), hospitals (e.g., fees for services at government

19

Paulais (2012). Chapters

provided health clinic); sea and port facilities (e.g., wharfage and harbor fees), and permits to use
and/or extract natural resources (royalties). 20
Central vs. Local Revenue.
For a system of federalism for which an intended high degree autonomy is to be accorded to the FMS
and its local governments, having clarity between what constitutes a central vs. a state/local “own”
revenue is of considerable importance. A failure to have such clarity will undermine the very essence of
fiscal federalism, which is to recognize that because of spatial considerations different types of government
are positioned differently to deliver different types of public services in order to best deliver a total bundle
of public services that most efficiently reflects citizen preferences and community needs. In this regard, a
potentially problematic matter for revenue assignment is to fail to distinguish between the government
that makes the payment for a public service from the government that made the decision to structure the
taxes that fund that payment.
What constitutes a central revenue is generally straightforward: it is money that that is generated through
a central government legislatively levied tax or non-tax fee/charge that is initially deposited in a central
government treasury account. 21 This is true even if for administrative (or political) convenience, revenue
collection is administered state government (German länders, in Canada the asymmetric case of Quebec
province and the oblasts of the former Soviet Union.)
Local Own Source Revenue.
A topic that merits further explanation is what constitutes a “local” (FMS) revenue—a topic that goes to
the heart of the case for a multi-tiered national revenue system of the form envisaged in the Provision a
Constitution. 22
Taxes for local (FMS) may be divided into categories of decreasing local autonomy (Table 1). For a tax or
fee to be considered a “local own source tax” the FMS or its sub-state governments (municipalities,
villages, districts) must, at a minimum, have the authority to determine rate of the tax or the level of the fee
or charge. If this basic requirement of the ability to set its “own” tax rate or level of the fee at the margin—
that is, a rate/fee that generates the extra shilling (Sh. So.) for local own use –is not met, then the revenue
cannot be classified as a “local” tax or non-tax revenue. One will note from Table 1 that this basic
requirement allows for federal-member/state-local governments tax base conformity (harmonization) of
tax bases.

20

The classification of government imposed charges for the flow of utility services is sometimes classified as a tax
(S. Africa) or as a fee (United States).
21
For Somalia: Provisional Constitution of 2012, Article 125.
22
This lack of clarity is not limited to country policy deliberations. Thus, the Government Finance Statistics (GFS)
of the Intentional Monetary Fund are reported in a manner that lumps together as a subnational or local revenue
both subnational receipts from tax sharing of central collections and “own" taxes and non-tax revenues (Ebel and
Yilmaz. 2004).
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Table 1. Classification of Subnational Government (SNG) Revenues

High
Revenue
Autonomy

Constrained
Local
Autonomy

Principle/Criterion

Illustrations

SNG choses the tax base and set
the rate. The only revenue bases
sources “off limit” are those for
which the Center is guaranteed
exclusive rights (e.g., customs
taxes,
passport issuance,
patents).

Highest degree of own – source revenues. Most often
pertains to fees and charges. E.g., in Rwanda the property
tax and a wide variety of fees, business licenses and permits
(Yilmaz, 2010). Kenya, S. Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe
also generally provide for tax base autonomy. However in
these
five cases the central government has the legal
authority to override local decisions (Vaillancourt and Yatta,
2008).

SNG sets tax rate only

Necessary and sufficient condition for categorization as
“own revenue”. Under this arrangement the SNG conforms
to the central tax base but retains the authority to set its
own tax rate without limit (including the option to apply a
zero tax rate). South African local governments have
discretion over property tax rates (Bird and Slack, 2014). Tax
rate autonomy for some local taxes without a central veto
occurs in Benin, Niger, Malawi, and Mali (Vaillancourt and
Yatta, 2010)

SNG sets tax rate, but only within
centrally permissible ranges

A typical practice is to cap the top rate a local government
may impose. Under this circumstance be efficiency gains
from being federal are greatly diminished (Hungary
turnover taxes and property taxes in Benin, Japan, Poland,
South Africa, and Russia).

Tax sharing whereby central/local
revenue split can be only changed
with consent of its SNG

Can result when a local authority collects the tax and remits
to the center. Denmark’s Municipal Councils have nonlegally binding but well established formal arrangement
with the central government “Tax Denmark” autonomously
levy income tax surcharge.

Revenue sharing with share
determined unilaterally by central
authority.

100% control by center. E.g., Australia (VAT), Democratic
Republic of the Congo (total national revenues); Gabon
(personal income tax); Senegal (motor vehicle taxes and
other specific taxes); Nigeria. VAT and mineral revenues;
common in Central and South East Europe.

Central government sets rate and
base of “ SNG revenue”

May accompany political decentralization

No
Autonomy
Source: Adapted from (OECD/Jensen , 2001) and OECD/Blochliger and Rabesona, 2009. Also see Table 2.

The 35 member OECD countries generally accord SNGs a high degree of revenue autonomy, but there is a
and a mixed record in Latin America (other than in the OECD member federations of Argentina and
Mexico), Central and Eastern Europe, and East Asia, and South Asia (although India local authorities set
property tax rates subject to state discretion).
In Saharan Africa there are several examples of local autonomy, Kenya, South Africa, and Tanzania
allow local discretion over the setting of property tax rates (Bird and Slack, 2004). Rwanda local
governments have full authority over their property tax rate and base (and collection) as well as a high
degree of own-revenue authority to levy fees (e.g., sale of animals, market fees, licenses and permits, and
the setting of tolls on locally owned roads and bridges). Yilmaz (2010).
Shared Revenue
An important implication of the definition of an “own” revenue is that revenues that accrue to one
government, typically a central government, that are then “shared” in some manner (some percent of the
total collections or by a formula) with other governments in an intergovernmental system are not to be
recorded as “revenue” to the recipient government that has no independent powers to affect those revenues
(Martinez -Vazquez and Timofeev, 2005; Muwonge and Ebel, 2014). In this case of revenue sharing, the
monies received are properly classified as an intergovernmental grant, which is a matter to be addressed
when examining the third of the four fundamental questions listed above.
Similarly, monies received by a government derived from grants and loans are receipts, not revenues.
Thus, for example, in the case monies generated through of a loan (e.g., from the World Bank or other
International Financial Institution) are receipts, which in the case of a loan or bond must be repaid and,
thus (i) recorded in the government’s financial records as a receipt when deposited in the local treasury,
and (ii) as an expenditure when debt service payments are made. This is why in listing of the fourth of
the four fundamental questions facing any intergovernmental society, the language refers to the “the timing
of receipts for financing the public’s capital”.
Revenue “Assignment”
The use of the phrase revenue “assignment” became widely used in the public finance literature in the
1990s when the policy focus was on that of the fiscal decentralization of financial roles from historically
strong central authorities to “their” local governments. 23 It was a trend and a term that was (in still is) in
appropriate use in Eastern and Central Europe, Eastern Asia, South Asia, and Latin America. It is also
a term that has crept into—indeed, still typifies-- much of the public finance literature. (e.g., Tosun and
Yilmaz, 2010; UNECA, 2010; Vaillancourt and Yatta 2010; Muwonge and Ebel, 2014, and Negussie,
2016).
The problem with the term is that it may imply to some that the decision of “which revenues are most
appropriate for use by which type of government” is a centrally determined “top-down” process. In the
case of a unitary governmental structure, this is just fine—indeed, just the right way to think about second
23

As Peteri (2017) details, “fiscal decentralization” encompasses three distinct arrangements or variants:
Deconcentration or administrative decentralization whereby regional offices of central ministries are established in
local jurisdictions for the purpose of the composition of local goods and services to be provided; delegation, which
can be characterized as an principal—agent relationship among different type of governments and devolution
whereby by independent local self-governments are established. Elements of all three variants will occur with
federalism
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of the four fundamental questions for an intergovernmental society. But this is not the case for a federal
constitution that accords a high degree of fiscal sovereignty to the member states
And, on this score, Somalia has a chance to get it right. Rather than declaring that the question that the
determination of “which revenues are most appropriate for use by which type of government” is a
matter for central government legislation, the Provisional Constitution adopts language that is allows for
a cooperative federalism: “the responsibility for the raising of revenue shall be given to the level of
government where it is likely to be the most effectively exercised” (Provisional Constitution, Article 50,
para f).
Thus, other than with respect to four areas revenue roles appropriately reserved for the FGS powers
(foreign affairs, national defense, immigration, and c itizenship) the Provisional Constitution avoids
specifying a checklist of rules of how financial resources will assigned among types of governments, but
rather lays out a set of principles that envisage a process that opens of the opportunity for a knowledge
–based dialogue for developing robust intergovernmental institutions to facilitate ongoing negotiation
….” (World Bank, 2015. vi; 36-40; Peteri, 2017). The Provisional Constitution further allows pre-existing
states (of which now Puntland is the only practical example) to exercise powers given by their state
constitutions24, 25.
Recognizing these caveats, the phrases “allocation of revenue authority” and “revenue mobilization”
may be interchangeably used refer to the process of “revenue assignment” throughout the remainder
of this Note.
Finance Follows Function.
The four fundamental questions are sequential as well as intertwined. Thus, the decision about the design
of only one of the four questions may distort, or support, the design of the other three questions (World
Bank, 2015, 38). With respect to the first two of the four—the “assignment questions”, the rule is that
the decision of which type of government will be responsible for providing which set of public goods and
services (the function of government) should precede the determination of the question of which revenues
to assign (finance). That is, “finance follows function”.26
There are two good reasons for the principle of finance-follows- function… along with a very important
caveat. The first goes to the matter of question of a citizen willingness to pay taxes—that policymakers
cannot knowledgeably establish the required level of subnational revenues independent having a reasonably
clear sense of the bundle of services that citizens expect their governments to government to deliver. As
phrased below, governments tax to spend.

24

World Bank (2015). p.36.
There is a further FGS/FMS sorting out dialogue needed with respect granting FGS the role for carrying out
traditionally accepted powers of a central state (e.g., maintaining an army, issuing visas, establishing customs
barriers). Peteri, 2017.
26
Mclure, 1993; Balh and Martinez-Vazquez, 2005; Peteri, 2017 and others.
25

The second is that ignoring the interplay between the finance follows function rule runs the risk of
undermining one of the most basic responsibilities of government, which is to properly macro-manage the
national economy.
Governments Tax to Spend.
The first, and perhaps such an obvious reason, that finance-follows-function probably does not need be
mentioned—but then again, it obvious enough that it must said: government’s tax to spend.
Unless citizens see the benefits that accrue to them from paying taxes and fees, a critical element of the
social contract that allows a government to count on a willingness to pay for these services will collapse—
and, thus, undermine the public finance system as a whole.
And, on this matter, Somalia has some work to do. A review at the most recent data reveals a matter of
concern for the FGS, which shows that 84 percent of recurrent expenditures are being spent on the FGS
itself, either in form compensation of the central (federal) government employees or its “use of goods and
services”.27 To date the FGS has been able to finesse the need to make the link between spending and a
citizen willingness to pay taxes by financing itself through a combination of a (i) trade taxes and fees that
are largely paid by –exported to—non- residents and (ii) and donor grants. 28
But this arrangement may about to change. There is some recent survey evidence that citizens are looking
to the new government to do more than pay for its employees and office supplies. In January of this year
the Mogadishu-based Heritage Institute for Policy Studies conducted a public opinion poll that found that
there is a citizen demand for public services. The need for improved public safety (security) led the list,
followed by fixing “a broken education system” (nearly 70 percent of children of school age are not in
school), putting a national healthcare program in place (e.g., disease control, community health education
and awareness programs, monitoring and regulatory capabilities), and job development (two thirds of the
14-29 year old cohort is unemployed). 29 A related concern (not reported in the HIPS survey) is that the
FGS capital expenditures account for less than a half percent of GDP, a policy that if continued will
probably guarantee it status as a fragile state.30
The FGS current use of nearly all external funds to pay for itself combined with the rising expectations of
its citizens and it’s remarkably low investment in providing an infrastructure for future consumption is a
clear argument for quickly sorting out the expenditure and revenue assignment questions and moving just
as quickly at establishing an intergovernmental revenue system.
Macroeconomic Management.
The second reason for the finance follows function rule -to-follow-function rule is that getting the rule
wrong can lead to a significant macroeconomic mess. Take, for example, the case of the Colombian
Constitution of 1991 that incorporated a provision for a rapid increase in the sharing of central revenues
with local authorities to demonstrate the nation’s commitment to becoming functionally intergovernmental.
27

FGS MoF (2015) cited in World Bank (2015) Table 3.2. Total Recurrent expenditures ($US 184.5 m in 2015)
accounts for 4.5% of GDP (excluding Somaliland).
28
On average for 2012-14, 91 percent for of total tax revenue for 2012-14) World Bank (2015), p. 16
29
Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (2017); World Bank (2015). Table 21.
30
The link between allocating current revenues for the purpose of paying for the public’s capital (infrastructure)
and future economic growth is well established. In the economist’s jargon, society reduces its current consumption
(saving) in order to ensure future consumption (investing). For a review see Paulais (2012); Ebel and Prasad (2017)
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Despite the well-intended nature of “top down” revenue assignment, that the policy failed to re-assign
spending responsibilities from the center to the localities culminated in excessive public debt, which
then precipitated a private debt crisis.31
Simultaneity in Assignment.
The principle that that finance follows function is not contested here. However, there is a corollary: to the
extent possible, make expenditure and revenue assignment decisions simultaneously. Empirical results of
cross-sectional analysis suggest that: (i) the simultaneous decentralization of a national government’s taxing
and spending powers exerts a negative and significant influence on overall public sector size; and (ii) there
is a payoff in terms of improving a nation’s macroeconomic performance.32

Universal Principles… From Theory to Practice
The Theory of the Public Budget in an Intergovernmental Society

The traditional analysis of public finance lays out a way of looking at the role of governments by examining
three public sector competencies, each of which stems from the economics of private market failure. 33, 34






The maintenance of full employment and price level stability ( stabilization).
The determination and attainment of an equitable distribution of income among its c itizenry. 35
(distribution of income and wealth, which in an intergovernmental context refers to redistribution
policies with respect to both people and places )
The avoidance of a misallocation of the use of society’ s scarce economic resources that results
from certain inefficiencies due to the operation of the private market system (allocation).

Clearly, these functions may overlap. For example, tax and fee financing of a highway road project will
re-direct resources from private to public sector uses (allocation) and, in the process, redistribute income
31

Ebel and Prasad, 2017.
Ehadie, 1994; Ebel and Yilmaz, 2004; Boadway and Shah, 2013.
33
Musgrave (1959 ); Others have argued for a broader model depending on the special circumstances of a system
under change Bird, Ebel, Wallich (1995) note that in the Central European “post-socialist” transition the functions
of privatization of the state-owned-enterprise regime and the maintenance of the social and health safety net
became key local functions.
34
The sources of “market failure” whereby the private market-price system fails to efficiently allocate resources
include e (i) good and services for which there is a demand but for which the exclusion principle does not apply
(pure public goods); (ii) concentration of n of monopoly power; (iii) positive or negative externalities (incomplete
markets (spillover effects);(iv) incomplete markets (under supply of some goods for which there is a willingness to
pay); (v) incomplete information, and (vi) macroeconomic disturbances. This topic is addressed Musgrave (1983);
Stiglitz and Rosengard (2015), and others.
35
The function of/responsibility for equalizing incomes by place—in the case of Somalia—across its geographic
member states and regions—is the topic of the third of the four fundamental questions, which is how to structure
a system of intergovernmental grants.
32

in favor of residents living along and at the end of the transportation path (distribution). If the project is
very large it may be a component of a centrally funded job-generation effort (stabilization). In addition,
the method of financing infrastructure (likely a m ix of bonds, special tax and revenue assessments, asset
sales and external grants) may have another set of allocation, distribution, and stabilization effects.

This stabilization-distribution-allocation breakdown provides a the basic framework for addressing the
fundamental questions of public budget policy to be addressed in this Briefing Note—which type of
government, central or local—should be charged with the performance of each these three tasks? And,
given that answer, what type of revenues should be assigned in order to carry out the three roles of a
public sector?

Underlying the answer to both questions is that of the degree of “econom ic openness” of the
governmental jurisdiction. I n a “closed economy” whereby the central government has the legal authority
and access to the regulatory rules that enables it to isolate (or, at least, buffer or control) parts of its
economy from the rest of the world, impacts of fiscal policy can be largely lim ited to the residents of the
jurisdiction. That is, the “spillovers’ to neighboring nations of the benefits of public budget policy can
be minim ized. Although no economy is fully closed, especially in this era of globalization, a wellfunctioning national (in Somali’ s case, federal/FGS) government with the authority to restrict the flow of
goods and services and the factors of production (e.g., labor, capital) across its borders approximates this
structure. As a result, the interjurisdictional factor and goods mobility within the nation-state need not
become a major consideration in key aspects of national budget policy

However, a crucial asymmetry exists for the making of budget policy in the member states of a federation
due to the more “open” nature of their economies. Unlike the well- functioning central government of a
nation state, the member states in a federal society will not have the authority to legislate tariffs, quotas,
or license barriers to restrict the flow of goods and services across their borders. Nor, will member states
and their localities have the authority to constrain the interstate movement of the factors of production
through migration controls, capital controls, foreign exchange rate policy and the like.

Given this asymmetry, the character of central vs. member state budget policy changes. One implication
is that the stabilization and distribution goals are primarily the concern of the c entral government. A
second is that this assignment of competencies leads to an important first step in the sorting out of
revenue authority among different types of government.
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Why Central (FGS) Tax Policy Matters

Stabilization. There are reasons why in a well- functioning federal system, the center rather than its
constituent subnational units, can best carry out stabilization policies. The first follows from the openeconomy realty that subnational governments will be unable to effectively induce changes in their
output, employment, and price levels through fiscal policy —the discretionary manipulation of ownrevenues and expenditures. Although subnational tax and spending policy may be directed toward
local residents (e.g., a large scale public employment program, or an attempt to change the rate of control
the rate of change of the price level), the stabilization effect within the jurisdiction will be greatly
dampened because markets (factor and product) are so interrelated that spending leakages result.

For example, if a single FMS were to takes on the task of a “full employment” program that reduces its
rate of joblessness well below above its neighboring state, one can not only expect an in-migration of new
residents making the job search, but also, the see the spending of residents leak across state borders.
This is particularly true for Somalia which is both highly consumption intensive (in 2014 household
consumption was equal to 134 percent of GDP) and import reliant (2014 net exports are a negative 47
percent). Thus, for a given level of state output, the unemployment rate problem will re-emerge. I n the
economist’ s terminology, the spending multiplier will be low (World Bank, 2015, Fig 3.3). 36

The same fiscal policy frustration will occur if a member state attempts to control price level (which is not
the same as controlling the cost of living). Such a subnational attempt at fiscal policy would likely require
the FMS will to either (i) raise taxes to a such a level that it would lead to unemployment and/ or (ii)
engage in deficit spending, which, if the debt is not well managed, will a pose a threat to the sought-after
price stability for FMS and FGS alike (World Bank, DMPED, 2017).

In contrast, central government has a critically important stabilization partner – an independent central
bank that is designed to regulate the nation’ s banking system control the supply of money and credit.
This, in turn, can facilitate the center the ability to engage in deficit (or surplus) financing of its current

36

Recognizing this open economy reality does not rule out the merits of a member state or its sub-state
governments instituting a local economic development strategy (e.g., infrastructure spending to enable private
sector growth, making the distinction between the public sector provision vs. of a public service production of a
public service); nor does it suggest that the member state should not become the agent of the central government
for funding and implementing a national employment policy through a central-member state grant program.
Indeed, there is good case for just such intergovernmental cooperation.

operating budget and thus, more effectively address than can subnational governments cyclical shocks
which are typically national in scope (symmetric across regions). 37,38

But, to be able to do carry out such countercyclical budget policy, the center must be in a fiscal position
to do so, which, in turn, means it must have access to broad based revenue tools such as a broad based
tax on consumption (value added) and income (personal income, including capital income and levies on
business profits). 39

The second reason that stabilization policy is a central function is that managing stabilization policy is
sim ilar to an insurance contract whereby the central authority agrees to the task of evening out income
variations that result from regional or exogenous shocks. It follows that the center is best suited to assume
the risks of volatile revenue sources; in particular, taxes on natural resource exploration and exploitation
(petroleum, minerals, fishing, forestry) and the notoriously capricious company tax on corporate net
income (profits).

And third, there is the practical matter it is the center’ s and the central bank’s job to coordinate on foreign
exchange policy.40 I t follows that the center must have control over international trade taxes. Thus, the
authority to collect customs duties and c lear imports into the country becomes a central responsibility.

Distribution. As noted above, there is both a “people” and a “place” aspect to a policy of the distribution
of income and wealth among a nation’ s citizens.

People. When it comes to securing an equitable distribution of income among citizens who have different
degrees an ability-to-pay taxes, the central vs. subnational division becomes less clear-cut that that for
carrying out the stabilization function. However, for the same reason of the open nature of subnational
economies, securing a broad degree of fairness equity in the overall distribution of income among a
nation's population largely becomes central responsibility. This is not to say that a member state or its
local governments will not have a role in poverty reduction. I ndeed, the proximity of a state/local
government local to the poor, and familiarity with and understanding of the institutional situations and
37

An independent central bank will not directly lend to the federal government (it’s up to that government do
borrow and then manage that debt) nor does the presence of a central bank guarantee good coordination of
monetary and fiscal policy (Boadway and Shah, 2009).
38
This argument as well as the counter- argument made by some question a central role in controlling the money
supply is addressed by Boadway and Shah (2009, Ch.14)
39
A further argument for central authority for implementing a value added tax stems from the need for one
government to act on behalf the entire nation to deal with the complexities of tax administration
40
Which is not readily accomplished with Somalia’s dollarized economy.
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hostile environs the poor inhabit in different regions and communities, provide advantages to
decentralized governmental units in designing and implementing antipoverty policies. (Bird, et.al, 1995;
Rao, 2002). The policy implication is that, in the developing-country context, the central government will
(i) have to have the revenue tools to generate the resources for poverty alleviation programs as well as
(ii) be able to turn to state and local governments to undertake program design and implementation. 41
Again, federalism as a cooperative venture.

Places. Once the new Somali becomes intergovernmentally revenue capable, two types of fiscal
imbalances will emerge. The first is a vertical fiscal imbalance between expenditure and revenues
among different types of government. The vertical imbalance reflects the fiscal reality that, as intended,
central governments will have control of the nation’ s most productive tax bases –e.g., the taxes on
personal and general business income. The second, which is already now the Somali case, is a
horizontal fiscal imbalance that occurs when the differences in expenditure needs and revenuegenerating ability vary across sim ilar types of subnational governments since some jurisdictions are
more revenue base rich and/or less need impacted than others. The polic ies for addressing /adjusting
for these twin fiscal imbalances, which goes to the third of the four fundamental questions facing any
intergovernmental society, is adequately disc ussed elsewhere (Abdullahi, 2017).

Why Local (FMS) Revenue Policy Matters

The Allocation Function. The foregoing discussion leads to a focus the third of the three competencies
of the public budget— commandeering resources to paying for a public goods and services ranging from
health clinics and elementary/secondary education to picking up the garbage to arranging for police and
fire safety (Peteri, 2017). Getting the allocation competency right is the raison d’être for the state/local
role in revenue mobilization.

The reason for the primacy of the state/local role in allocation competency stems from the
“decentralization theorem” that the set of governments closest to the citizens can adjust budgets to local
preferences in a manner that best leads to the delivery of a bundle of public services responsive to
community preferences. Subnational governments—the FMS and its localities—thus become the vehicle
provide services to identifiable recipients until the tax price for those services reflects the benefits
received (Oates, 1972). To put it more casually, but aptly, the elected legislative bodies of Puntland and
Somaliland will have far more knowledge of the public service demands and how to supply and pay for
those services than will the Somali national parliament. It follows that to in order to be able perform this
role for what they have been elected to do, state/local officials-- subnational governments-- must be

41

This is an example of the delegation variant of an intergovernmental fiscal system. (Peteri, 2017),

allowed to exercise own source taxation at the margin and, too, be in a financial position to do so. This is
why getting right state and local revenue autonomy matters to the success of a federal society.

Who Should Pay? Benefits Received
Along with the decentralization theorem, the benefits received serves as a foundation for the efficiency
and equity gains that a well- designed system of federalism can provide. I n this context, “efficiency”
requires that revenue policy should be designed so that this who benefit from the provision of a flow of
public services are those who pay for those services. This fits the public economist’ s broader concept of
efficiency that occurs when a society is getting the maximum benefits from the use of its scarce resources.
(Mankiw, 2015, 7e.). As it turns out, the benefits approach tends to be not only efficient but also
equitable. Thus, just as one who consumes a private good or service in the market place pays a market
prices for that purchase, the user of the public service will pay a tax price.

In a private market exchange where there is reasonable degree of competition among buyers and sellers
matters, the private market price mechanisms provides the efficient user/payor quid-pro-quo. But,
when one turns to how to collectively set tax/revenue prices, spatial considerations come into play, not
only regarding the type of revenue for a government to utilize but, too which type of government is bestplaced to utilize which revenue

Though at first glance the matter of “which government shall have the authority to raise which set of
revenues?” may appear overly complex, if the policymaker proceeds by applying the principle of spatially
matching benefit areas to financing areas and, then, having done that, locally applying the principle to
the special fiscal architecture circ umstances of Somalia, things can work out rather well.

To further sort this out, consider the two classes of public service benefits: specific and general. In each
case the resolution of question of “which government” shall have the authority over which revenue
source” comes down to the principle of matching those who benefit to those who will pay. Thus, when
the match of the benefits of a public service are largely (if not exclusively) derived largely by the residents
of an FMS or to an even smaller area with in an FMS, the financing area should be state and/or local.
However, when the flow of services “spills over” over local boundaries with there will be a case for tax
base overlapping, or concurrent revenue assignment among governments. This benefit area may so
significantly cross FMS boundaries and/or be of such benefit-importance to the broader Somali population
that there will be a concurrent federal role.

In its most strict interpretation, the benefit principle dictates a reliance on user charges and fees. Note
that application of the benefits principle does not necessarily require full cost recovery or the restriction
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of levying the tax or fee on only residents of the taxing jurisdiction. This is because the beneficiaries of
the net fiscal benefits of a flow of subnational public services may not reside in the tax or fee levying
benefit area. 17 I n this case, some of the beneficiary charge (or tax) must be designed so that it can be
shifted to the non-resident. Take, for example, the visitor to a Somali city who benefits from being able
to use local streets and enjoy the other public amenities of her/his visit. Now the task for the local council
to come up with a set of taxes and/or fees that while legally levied (tax impact) on all users of visitor
activities such as lodging, entertainment, and restaurant meals, will be effectively shifted on to the nonresident (tax incidence).

Specific Benefits

FMS and its localities. As policymakers consider the imposition of a system of beneficiary charges, a key
consideration will be on how large a specific a benefit area may be. I n most cases it will be determined
that fees and charges are particularly well suited for use by a state and local authority. As Bird (1996)
advises, “wherever possible charge”. Examples from sub-Saharan Africa include: 42

17



Fees charged for direct use of a facility or consumption of a service: schools, school text books,
slaughterhouses, utility consumption (electricity, water), sewers and sanitation, refuse
collection, bus terminals and bus terminal services, rental cars, funeral services and funeral
service cars, cemeteries billboard and banner advertising, garage services, fire brigade
services, parking, road and canal tolls, entry fees to facilities such as museums, stamp
(documentary) fees, sports facilities, and parks, motor vehicle tags and inspection, motor
vehicles including motor bikes and land cruisers, right of way use (e.g., on telecoms) and road
use charges (which may be structured as a tax for example, on motor fuel or other vehicle
characteristics such, as in Somaliland, the value of the vehic le).



Lic ense fees paid for the privilege of an activity (business establishment, driving permits,
vehicle use, and stamp fees to defray the cost of public monitoring of an activity such as land
transfer and titling).



The betterment lev ies noted above that defray the to pay for local infrastructure (measured
by increases in land values consequent on the granting of planning decisions, spec ial

The term "net" is stressed to indicate that those spillover flows (externalities) may be positive or negative. For
the negative externality (the most obvious case is pollution), a tax or fee may be levied to reduce the net costs
through reducing consumption or production.
42
Some fees and charges listed here may be central in some countries.

assessments to cover costs for things such as sidewalk construction and repair, and developer
fees to finance both on-site and off-site infrastructure). 18

Central Fees and Charges. When the service derives from the role of the central sovereign state, the
following examples match centrally: Fees for (i) clearing customs; (ii) patents and trademarks and (iii)
passport issuance, (iv) airport arrivals and departures; (v) airline landing and slotting; (vi) ocean fishing
permits; and (vii) food and drug safety inspections.

Overlapping/Concurrent Charges. Recognizing the multijurisdictional (polycentric) nature of
infrastructure services that cross government boundaries, user charge finance takes the policymakers into
the realm of coordinating benefit areas, including that of developing regional (e.g., multistate or even
international) compacts for revenue authority. The charging for potable water services is a good example
whereby the source—the supply—of water is typically in a different location that the place of distribution
to the final user, who, though distant from the supply area, nonetheless benefits from water supply the
provision and, thus the costs associated with infrastructure planning, construction, maintenance, and
monitoring (Frank and Martinez-Vazquez, 2016; Ebel and Vu, 2016). Now a water system-wide charge
must be authorized for imposition by a multistate regional authority, the center or the FMS (or the center
or FMS that is acting as an agent for a regional authority). The supply charge may be both a lump sum
fee (capital cost recovery) and periodic fee (operating and maintenance) on the final consumer.

But this is just the water supply factor. Next comes the charges required to cover the cost of distribution
to the final user. Now identifying the benefit area is a more straightforward matter since there is likely
to be a clear local character to the distribution function and thus, the payment mechanism; e.g., a
commercial and household connection fee complemented with a water use fee that may vary with the
(i) amount of water consumed; (ii) tim ing of use; and/or (iii) by property type or type of consumers
(Bahl and Linn, 1992). Sim ilar examples of having to sort out revenue assignment to satisfy the matching
of beneficiary with payor include the supply and distribution of other utility services (telecommunications,
electricity), the use of canals and other waterways; mass transit, and disposal of solid waste.

There are two final observations to be made regarding special benefit charges: (i) to the extent that
quid pro quo relationship between user and payor eases the identification aspect of revenue

18

0n-site infrastructure, some of which may be part of the developer's own responsibility, includes public facilities
constructed on or adjacent to an area being developed (roads, pavements, water and sewage distribution
networks), Off-site infrastructure includes development-related arterial roads, schools, fire and police stations,
parks, and museums, whether or not built on the developed area,
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administration, this also solves the question of which government shall manage and monitor a service;
and, (ii) quite apart from which government levies which fee, there is also an educational merit of
reminding the citizen that prices (costs) can be public as well as private—that is, the reason governments
tax and charge is to address spending needs. 43

Generalized Benefits

More conceptually problematic, but easier to implement (administratively, if not politically), are the
"generalized benefits" that can be related in a logical way to services received. Thus, there is a rationale
for FGS and well a FMS (and, in some large area cases, localities) for the broad-based taxation of the
business enterprise on income or receipts: using the business enterprise as a tax collecting intermediary
serves as a conduit for taxing individuals wherever they may reside (including nonresident factor suppliers,
such as shareholders) for the benefit of local services accruing initially to the business enterprise. Now
government services, central and local, are appropriately treated as a factor of production sim ilar to land,
labor, and capital, and their costs should be incorporated into the pricing structure.

The generalized case also arises for state/local broad-based personal taxation (PIT) if it can be determined
that the generalized benefits of local government spending are related to one's improvement in
production (income earned) or the ability to consume (income spent). That governments create those
taxable benefits are applicable for a central government (there is little controversy here) and, in many
situations, a subnational entity (for example, employment-generating agglomeration centers such as
Mogadishu, Kismayo, Bosaso, and Hargeisa). I n the case state and /or local use of the a PIT, unless there
is some other reason to believe that benefits change more or less rapidly than income or consumption, it
is reasonable to rely on flat-rate taxes for financing generalized services (McLure, 1999). Too, for purposes
of simplicity and ease of revenue administration (both of which are aspects of efficiency), there is merit
to a harmonization (conformity) of the tax base across all PIT levying jurisdictions.

For the central or state entity, either a production (origin) tax, such as those on personal income or payroll,
or a destination approach is acceptable ( e.g., a FMS surcharge levied on top of the central VAT base).
43

What is not straightforward are the twin questions of and level of a charge. There are several options, the choice
of which depends on both the nature of the activity for which there is a charge and administrative considerations.
The design (and, with that, the level) options include: marginal cost pricing (for the economist, conceptually neat,
but hard to define and measure); average cost pricing (easier to calculate if, as with other design approaches, only
financial costs are considered); multipart tariffs (in the simplest form, fixed asset charges, such as a connection fee
combined with an additional fee for use of a system); and going-rate charges (or, perhaps more aptly, fiscal expedient
whereby the degree of user demand elasticity is captured).

However, for the local (eg. a sub-state urban area), an additional inquiry is necessary, because people
may not work where they live. If the benefits are most closely linked to the production or earning of
income, the jurisdiction should opt for a production-base tax, such as a tax on payroll levied where the
employment occurs. But, if the benefits from tax payment local spending are more likely to be related to
the public’ s enabling of a destination market, the policy design argues for resident-based income taxation
and/or a sales tax. Which is the stronger case? A priori, "basic" local services (for example, schools, health
clinics, and neighborhood libraries, maintenance of local roads and sidewalks, and street lighting) are
consumed by (benefit) those who live in, rather than work in, a jurisdiction. This suggests that the FMS
and its localities should stick to resident-based taxes on personal income and a retail sales tax.

Using the generalized benefits argument, could a FMS end up with generalized benefits taxation on both
production and consumption? Yes. The production rationale follows from the business enterprise
rationale, the consumption from the tax-financed services to residents. I ndividuals have several roles as
taxpayers: factor suppliers; income earners; consumers; and wealth holders. 44 Each role provides a “tax
handle”.

A sim ilar benefits case can be made for local use of the tax on real property, residential and commercial.
Users of property, owners and tenants alike, are beneficiaries of a wide array of generalized local services
for which specific charges are either not feasible or adequate for cost recovery. These services range from
community public safety and the judiciary, to primary education and community health and sanitation.

Further Spatial Considerations. Degree of Tax Base Mobility.

As noted, well-functioning FMS and its local governments are able to access some benefit tax bases more
readily than can a central government (some user charges, retail sales taxes, and real property taxes). 45
The FMS/ local list includes revenues that not only tend to satisfy the benefits rule, but also have the
merit of being levied on activities, and tax bases that are relatively immobile (real property and, depending
on the degree of resident or worker mobility, payroll); and for which the benefits of subnational services
(expenditure assignment) can be identified. A range of specific taxes and fees that have already been
identified above fit that criterion.

The taxation of natural resources presents a special case. Since natural resources such as petroleum
(including for Somalia the potential for off-shore exploitation) and m ineral m ining (feldspar, gypsum, iron
44

The imposition of tax on inheritances or estates is not addressed here.
Taxes on other forms of property (for example, an intangibles or wealth tax) are not well suited to open
economy jurisdictions.
45
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ore, kaolin, limestone, quartz, silica sand, tantalum, tin, and uranium) are often location-specific, they
satisfy the tax base immobility guideline and, thus, a case for FMS and local taxation. 46

However, other considerations argue for national taxation. There are three. First, as noted above in the
discussion of the center’ s stabilization role, natural resources revenues are notoriously volatile, thereby
making it just the wrong revenue to rely upon for local government that must have tax certainty to pay
for the “necessary” local public goods such as water distribution, heath clinics, and preschool and primary
education. Second, because an FMS government cannot take on debt to the extent that the center can,
the FMS a locality is not in a position to deficit finance once there is a downturn in global prices of the
natural resources and revenues plummet. Third, the equity argument against local taxation of natural
resources is a powerful one. Since natural resources are typically unevenly distributed across regions,
assigning natural resources to local governments would generate subnational differences in fiscal
capacities among jurisdictions.

The assignment solution is one of concurrent, but not necessarily, tax base overlapping taxation: First,
assign to the central government the role of broad based taxation of income or receipts generated by
business firm that is extracting/farming/managing the natural resource; and then also set up a state/local
tax regime to cover the costs of (i) controlling (and/or cleaning up) local environmental degradation and
(ii) building and maintaining a local off-site local infrastructure that services the natural resource business
activity.
________

A matrix that pulls together the forgoing discussion is presented in Table 2. The presentation is different
from the typical revenue assignment matrix that is organized by type of revenue (which, for getting a
quick first-glance at how revenue assignment might work can be useful), and instead by following text
presentation is arranged so that one can readily see the logic of how the Universal Principles (reading
down the left vertical column) serve to organize and illustrate Local Applications (reading across and then
down the four columns). The format further allows one to note practical illustrations of how different
countries sort out (or, in many cases agree upon) whether certain types of revenues are central, state,
local or concurrent or overlapping (the column on the right side of the Table). A special effort has been
made to illustrate Sub-Saharan African practice. 47 When using table to it is important to keep in mind that
because of the Universal Principles/Local Applications format, in “assigning” a type of revenue among
governments it is the principle that should prevail. But, this said, there are cases whereby for type of
tax is inappropriate vis-à-vis one principle, but acceptable considering another principle. This does not
mean that a revenue assignment cannot be, and should not be, made; rather that the principle that

46
47

www.faoswalim.org/.../geology-and-mineral-resources-somalia
With the assistance of Ms. Nellie Wanjiku Gaithuma

justifies the assignment of a particular tax —central vs. subnational—should be applied with an awareness
that balance of competing, or even, contractor objectives must be considered. .

To take an example: in going through Table 2 it is clearly noted (and also in the text) that for purposes of
macro-stabilization policy (e.g., ability of a government to engage in countercyclical fiscal policy)
assignment of a broad based general business tax on business enterprise (e.g., taxes on g ross receipts,
value added, VAT, business net income (profits) to a FMS is inappropriate. Thus, for example, the VAT
should be assigned to the FGS.

However, when one then considers the principle of benefits received, then the case for an apportioned
FMS general business tax is quite clear. There is not an inconsistency or contradiction here. What is being
said is that for reasons discussed in the text, the FSG must be the primary/most intensive user of the tax,
but that for reasons of tax base accessibility an FMS should certainly also turn to general business taxation
and in the interest of ease of revenue administration and minimization of taxpayer compliance costs
consider a the approach of an FMS imposed “own-source” surcharge that conforms to the FGS base.
Canada employs just such a “Dual VAT” system. (Ebel and Kalambokidis, 2005).

[Refer to Table 2 which is attached at the end of this document]
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Revenue Administration
Just as the tax assignment sequence is a way of thinking log ically about how to go about the job of
resource mobilization in an intergovernmental society, so, too, is that
of sorting out revenue
administration functions for Somali federalism. Thus, it is not too early in this historical Somali process to
be simultaneously thinking about the question of which government, FGS or FMS should collect the
revenues. 48,49

Why Revenue Administration Matters

There are three reasons why as paying attention to, and getting “right”, the revenue administration
process matters. The first is that to address only the topic of revenue assignment topic begs the
question of how to collect the assigned revenues, which, of course, is why one goes through the
assignment sorting out task in the first place.

The second is that “tax administration is tax policy”—that is, although it appropriate to first focus on the
questions of intergovernmental assignment tax policy, it is a lso the case that well how the tax is
administered can determine the extent to which the intended policy outcomes are accomplished
(Casanegra de Jantscher, 1990). Once a Parliament or Legislature drafts and then approves a tax law, tax
administrators step in: (i) writing the a rules and regulations to implement the law (ii) identifying and
registering the taxpayer; (iii) notifying taxpayers of their tax obligations; (iv) setting up a taxpayer
assistance facility; (v) sending out the tax bill while, inter alia, having to consider what to do if there is
not a reliable postal and street address system; (vii) establishing tax payment/collection mechanisms;
(viii) establishing a payment process; (ix) enforcing the tax payment obligation; (x) setting up a taxpayer
appeal process; (x) putting in place internal and external audit regimes, and (xi) coordinating with the
offices of the Budget, Treasury, and Comptroller to producing on schedule a required set of financial
reports to the satisfaction of credit rating agency experts and the taxpaying public alike.

The third reason why the topic of how revenues are implemented matters is that revenue administration
is not only key minimizing the costs of taxpayer compliance, but also about creating a “tax culture”
whereby c itizens have confidence that the process efficient, uniform, and free of corruption. Why?

48

On terminology: for purposes here the terms “tax administration”, “revenue administration” and a system for
system for “tax collection” are used interchangeably.
49
Further on terminology: recognizing that in the Somali federal system local governments are chartered by the
state (FMS), a reference to FMS revenue administration is made with the understanding that such reference may
include local government administration.

Because when it all comes together, for a fiscal system work requires a high degree of voluntary citizen
taxpayer compliance (Cyan, Koumpias, and Martinez-Vazquez, 2016).

Which Government Should Adm inister Which Set of Revenues?

In establishing an intergovernmental system of revenue administration, several critical questions arise for
Somali’ s to sort out. 50 These include: is there a sequence for addressing the components of revenue
administration listed above—that is, what is the priority when everything is a priority? How does Somalia’ s
revenue architecture—its demographics, economic base, institutions (private and public), and access to
technology—shape what makes will “work”? Will there have to be “presumptive” set of taxes, charges
and fees to complement tools that typically apply to a formal and relatively easy to tax economy? How
can costs of collection and operation be measured, let alone managed? What is the nature of the tradeoff
between the accounting cost argument that tax administration design should implemented to m inimize
the costs of operation 1985 vis-à-vis the implicit, difficult to measure and yet very important costs
of a loss of political and social accountability that may result from a cost accounting focus? (Vaillancourt,
Clemens, Palacios, 2008; Martinez Vazquez, 2010; Commins and Ebel, 2010). And, as it embarks on
building its organizational capacity to become a function federal state, what can experiences of other
nation-states can Somalia draw on to inform the intergovernmental arrangements for adm inistering
revenues?

The focus of this discussion is on the last of these five questions. As with the preceding sections on
revenue assignment, the purpose here is to take a first Somali-relevant look at international practice
with a special focus on the question of whether an activity, is this case revenue administration, should
become a central, state , local or concurrent task.

Universal Principles, Once Again

For a start to look into this topic, there are four “overarching” findings that emerge from international
practice and “fit” with the revenue assignment discussion (Bird, 2015.)



The questions of (i) “which type of revenues are appropriate government” and (ii) “which type
of government shall administer which taxes” are related but separable.

50

Questions, some of which Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev note have received far too little attention (MartinezVazquez and Timofeev, 2010).
7/21/201810:54 PM
Page 31






As is also the case for addressing the all four of the fundamental questions facing any
intergovernmental society (page 4 of this paper), there is “no one-size-fits-all” right answer to
choosing between central vs. subnational revenue administration.
Recognizing the content of these first two findings does not imply that one that there are no
lessons to be learned addressing the question of “which government administers”.
Just as with federalism generally (as noted above, Watts 2008) “getting right” revenue
administration will be a work in progress. Although are guidelines for a well-designed and wellimplemented system of revenue administration, what may make sense in one era may not be the
right way for another time.

Centralized vs. Decentralized Administration

International practice reveals several models of how governments sorted out the intergovernmental
structure of revenue administration. Four models are illustrated in Table 3.


Fully Centralized Adm inistration, which may, or may not, be accompanied by SNG revenue
autonomy;



Independent Tax Authority whereby each type takes on the role of administering its set of ownlegislated revenues;



Decentralized Administration where the federal member state serves as an agent for collecting
its own revenues as well as all or some centrally legislated taxes;



And systems that can best be described as an asymmetric m ix each of the three types bulleted
above.

Also as with Table 2, the format of Table 3 is designed to focus on (i) federal systems but, too, with
appropriate references to unitary arrangements and (i) the type of tax practice (in this case,
administration rather than assignment) rather that organize the topic on a tax-by-type of tax.
Centralization of Revenue Administration
For countries that functioning central government and central government tradition, the m inim ization
of cost-of- administration approach is often (but as one will see in the case of China and Germany, not
always) cited as a decision in favor of some form of central revenue administration.
A core argument is that there are cost-minim ization merits a centralized system that allows one to take
advantage of economies of scale and scope that range from drawing on overhead-spreading activities
bulk purchasing of supplies and equipment (scale) to being able to have in one place a large, well trained
technical staff that can collaborate on related tasks (scope). 51 The case for centralization further goes to
51

Clearly there may be other that cost factors at play. These range from the factors such as a continuing tradition,
or on some cases, the legacy, of command and control political systems (notably, for Africa, including post WWI

the merits of reducing costs of taxpayer compliance—e.g., reducing the number of points of filing and
other regulatory contacts between taxpayer and tax administrator (a “one-stop taxpayer window”).
There is also the argument that centralized administration that the tax agency can best institutionalize
anti-corruption offices.
Decentralization to State/Local administrations
The argument that smaller can be better recognizes the merits taking advantage of features such as
overhead cost-management. But the then argument proceeds that having a tax office that is c loser to
the taxpayer and taxpayer circumstances reduces other indirect ( including implicit) costs that will occur
by having the taxpayer have to deal with a revenue official in some distant large bureaucracy. Factors
cited include the advantage of local tax officers having local knowledge of a revenue base and the unique
profiles “their” the taxpayers. 52
There is also the argument that in with decentralized operations citizens can more readily recognize
and address and corrupt administrative practices—the same merit asserted for pro-centralization, but
with a two different “twists” The first is that citizens tend to pay much closer attention to how their local
government is operating, and when it violates certain social norms, they can more easily politically
organize to control those practices (Smoke and Taliercio,2007) The second, which is a combination of
the expedient and practical a bit perverse, is that it is can be more difficult to clean up a large central
bureaucracy than it will be to “fence off” one of many state/local bureaucracies.(for a review of the
corruption literature, see Boadway and Shah, 2009)
Making the Choice of Which Government Administers
So, which works “best”, central or state/local? It depends on the presence and interplay of many
organizational, institutional, and human resource variables. To recog nize this—that there are
complexities-- does not make making the choice an insurmountable task. Just for a start for Somalia to
consider: it may make sense for the FGS to make as one of its priorities the setting of up of a bureaucracy
to structure and adm inister one of the most important and generally agreed upon of centrally assigned
taxes, the value added tax (VAT). , which, among other things, entails tracking nationwide activities such
as the proper filing of multistate credit and invoices and the imposition of border tax adjustments .
Similarly, a case can be made that since the Constitution makes international trade policy is a central
government competency, there is merit in further customs tax administration.
However, when it comes administrating of a c learly local tax base such as the property tax, a retail sales
tax, or the range of user fees for funding the current flow of infrastructure serves to locally owned public
assets (e.g., local roads, utility service distribution agencies, parks and recreational facilities), the tilt is
will be largely state/local.

colonialism) to efficiency consideration of (small) geographical size and population density. There are also similar
non-cost accounting decentralization of administration factors again including geography size and population but
also the nature of a nation state that is fragmented due to variables such as ethnicity, language, religion, and the
urban vs. rural mix (Bird and Ebel, 2007). For a checklist of revenue centralization “pros and cons” see Mikesell,
2007.
52
The topic of the role of traditional authorities in revenue administration is not addressed here. For a discussion
of how traditional authorities function as local governments, see Jackson and Marquette, 2003 and UNECA, 2007.
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I n addition there is the fiscal autonomy argument that if one type –of-government agency (centralized
or decentralized) is tasked with collection of revenues for another type of government, that there may
be an incentive for the tax administrator to make a greater effort to collect “its government’ s” revenues.
Mikesell characterizes the Soviet Union during the transition as having dual administration: while the tax
inspectors were offic ially and organized as part of the central government (deconcentration), the local
field staff had an incentive to be responsive to the interests of the local authorities that provided them
office, heat, and supplements to their salaries. One result was that regional authorities received cash and
the central government in Moscow received an in-kind payment that was arbitrarily valued. This
illustrates the incentive problem/question: will revenue administration efforts be when proceeds of that
effort go to another government treasury? (Mikesell, 2007).
As for the “one –stop-window” arrangement for easing compliance-- it can cut either way. The typical
Scandinavian practice opts for the centralized administration. That works for the Scandinav ians. But
the same one-stop arrangement fits the decentralized approach in the case of Germany.
_________
The task ahead for Somalia is to sort out the “it depends” by taking into account several factors ranging
from the (i) type of revenue to be administered (eg. VAT vs. the real property tax ); (ii) ability to take
advantage of institutional lead of the already established revenue administration capacity of Puntland
and Somaliland, and (iii) a cooperative recognition by all that although will take some time for the FSG to
become fully revenue administration capable, there are potentially significant payoffs to be had for FGS
and FMS alike..
Regarding this last point (iii) above, consider the experience, and evolving progress of, revenue
administration in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina. (World Bank, 2015; Fox and Wallich, 2007; Wallich
and Zhang, 2013). With the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Dayton Accords, 1995), the confederal
state Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was established with a fiscally weak single sovereign State of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and two sovereign “entities”: Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the terms of the Accords, the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
provided with no independent tax sources, thus having to rely on intergovernmental grants from the two
entities. The immediate post-Accords era was a fiscally tense one; but overtime the confederation has
become to look a bit more federal. A harmonized customs law was adopted in 1998, followed in 2001 by
legislation for harmonized excises taxes and a sales tax. Then, in January 2006 with the introduction of
a centrally assigned VAT, the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina single tax administration, the I ndirect Tax
Authority, was established (World Bank, 20150. Attesting to Kornai’ s axiom (1956) that a change in a
government is not a change in a system, but merely a pre-condition for a historical process, the BiH
experience suggests something very important for Somalia: sorting out and implementing
intergovernmental fiscal arrangements can serve as a bridge to functioning federal system

Coordination and Cooperation
And, on this whole matter of revenue policy-meets- revenue administration, one further observation is
merited: the making the choice between FGS, FMS or an overlapping/ cooperative system of revenue
administration is not an ”either/or” zero sum game. Vertical (FGS and FMS) and horizontal (FMS to

FMS) coordination of tax administration is the norm in many in federal systems. Indeed, the efficiency of
tax administration will suffer if independent tax authorities do not coordinate Martinez-Vazquez and
Timofeev, 2010). The types of administrative coordination, which can reduce costs of both tax
administration tax compliance for FGS and FMS alike , includes (i) the sharing knowledge on common
problems, old as well as emerging; (ii) trading information of innovative practices (e.g., from e-filing to
how to deal with the hard-to-tax informal economy); (iii) joint auditing of taxpayers whose operations
cross state and/or international borders; (iv) tax base harmonization that preserves meets the tests of
own-source revenue autonomy; (v) taxpayer identification (e.g., common taxpayer identification
numbers), (vi) joint research including cooperation in developing of revenue estimating models, and for
some revenues, especially the property tax, (vii) tax base valuation and assessment administration.
(Garzon and Freire, 2014; Franzsen and McCluskey, 2017)
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Table. 2. Sorting Out Revenue Authority Among Types of Government: Principles and Applications
Universal
Rationale

Principle/

Revenue Instrument

Central (FGS)

State (FMS)

Local (Sub-State)

Value Added Tax (VAT)

It is essential to assign
broad base taxes to
implement
stabilization
and
distribution.

State and substate (local) government
use of these taxes are not justified as
tools for stabilization policy; indeed use
by an FMS and its substate entities may
be cyclically perverse.

Further Notes

Macroeconomic Stabilization
Broad Based Tax on Business
Enterprise

Gross Receipts , Turnover
Tax(GRT)

Corporate Net
(profits, 𝝅 )

Broad Based Tax on Personal
Income

Income

Because central can
engage
in
deficit
finance, the center
best positioned utilize
due
volatility
of
revenue yield.
The
ability
engage
in
countercyclical deficit
finance also pertains
to VAT and GRT.

Personal Income Tax

On residents and
nonresidents
alike;
include capital income

Taxes
on
Revenues
derived from exploration
and
extraction
of
products arising from the

Natural
Resource
exploration
and
extraction; royalties

Worldwide: assignment of broad based
taxes on business receipts (GRT, VAT) to
the Center. African examples include VAT:
Botswana, Cameroon, Cape –Verde,
Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial,
Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho,
Madagascar,
Malawi,
Mauritius,
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania,
Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe ;
GRT: Ethiopia; Rwanda;
Profits (𝝅):
Ethiopia, S. Africa, Uganda All but one of
the OECD countries assigns a VAT to the
central governments. (US, taxes 𝝅 only )

Sub-Saharan African countries include:
Chad, Côte d’Ivoire Ethiopia, Gabon,
Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria, S. Africa,
Swaziland, and Zambia.

Unevenly
Distributed
Revenue Bases
Natural Resources
(e.g.,
minerals, petroleum, forestry,
water supply)

Not generally applicable except in the
case where FMS and Local property
taxation become appropriate in areas
where the exploration and extraction

Note that with petroleum production
countries often enter into a cost of
production sharing arrangement rather
than institute
a tax regime (Sudan).

sale of mining, petroleum,
forestry). These tax bases
may be shared with an
FMS under a broad based
business tax regime
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occurs,
especially
if
the
local
environment is damaged (Sudan in
disputed areas of S. Sudan). Also (i)
FMS/local tax and fee policy for paying
for costs (capital and O & M) for offsite related infrastructure (e.g., roads,
water and sanitation) and (ii) share of
central royalty income base (SNG sets
the rate).

Adoption of a central tax regime keep
available the option for some form of SNG
taxation of the exploration and extraction
process.

Table. 2 Continued Sorting Out Revenue Authority Among Types of Government: Principles and Applications

Universal Principles/Rationale

Revenue
Instrument

Central (FGS)

State (FMS)

Local (Substate)

Further Notes

Role of The Central “Sovereign”
International Trade

Customs and Trade Taxes

Central best suited to keep national border
integrity

Not an appropriate
FMS revenue. However,
Puntland
and
Somaliland employ a
wide set of customs and
trade (tariffs) taxes.

Worldwide: nearly always an exclusive
central role. How to sort out the customs
and trade tax authority between the FGS
and FMS will be a matter to be sorted out
as
Somali
federalism
becomes
organizationally
and
institutionally
capable. When/if the FMS vacates these
tax bases the FGS will have to consider
compensatory payments as part of the
Intergovernmental transfer system (grants
and /or a shared revenue arrangement)

User Fees

Passport issuance; immigration registration
and fees; patents and trademarks, copyright
fees, fees for use of central land, mail delivery
charges.

Not applicable.

Protecting the Commons

Effluent Fees; Carbon and other Taxes
Environmental Taxes. The open, globalized
economy calls for the cooperation of central
governments (and, as appropriate, their
regional and global partners)

Though the centre must take the lead in environmental protection due to the
economics of closed vs. open economies, to the extent that an FMS and/or its locality
can identify a local source of environmental damage, there is an FMS Role for adopting
and “own” environmental tax and fee policy.

Entire set of central revenues regardless of
source. Access to broad based taxes on
business and personal receipts & income
essential

[the degree “fairness’ of revenue incidence---how revenue payments are distributed
across household/individual income classes-- while an important policy
implementation matter, is not part of the revenue assignment question]

Distribution:People
equity)

(vertical

Distribution: Places/ (horizontal
equity
across
jurisdictions).

Entire set of FMS
revenues if the FMS

Not
applicable

In some cases (e.g., Pakistan) the
intermediate government may serve as

Equalization may be part of a
transfer system goal.
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establishes a state→
local aid program

the center’s agent to
state→local aid system

develop

a

Table. 2 Continued Sorting Out Revenue Authority Among Types of Government: Principles and Applications

Universal
Principals/Rationale

Revenue Instrument

Central (FGS)

State (FMS)

Not-tax revenues (user
taxes and fees employed
as revenue producers as
well as to adjust for
spillover
(e.g.,
environmental) effects;
selected sales (excises)

Motor Fuel Taxes;
Carbon and other taxes
on
use
of
the
environment
(e.g.,
effluent fees); use of
central govt.
land
(Rwanda), game and
other national parks
and reserves (Kenya)

Yes: principle of wherever possible levy
charges/beneficiary fees on users of
state and local services. Fees range from
use of library services and care for the
elderly to access to judicial services and
fire protection. S. Africa law includes
more than 125 user charges and fees
(2015/16). Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda
also employ a long list of fees and
charges

Kenya single business application tax and
license fees, market and slaughterhouse
fees, school nursery and matatu fees.
Uganda and Ethiopia also turn to market
and stall fees. Rwanda includes fees for
billboard advertising Puntland utilizes (i) a
series of registration fees on businesses
including
stamp/documentary fees&
taxes; (ii) taxes on transfer of ownership of
intangible assets; (iii) rental of property
vehicles and vessels; and (iv) registration of
vehicle rentals.

There may also be fees that overlap, but
are not harmonized with, central levies.
E.g., a variety of charges on motor
vehicle use, care for the elderly, food
quality inspection, and court fees. A lack
of harmonization of the tax/fee base will
likely occur since the central/state/local
benefit area will vary spatially and by the
demographic profile of the users.

____

Yes. When services are state (local)
supplied: state (local) levied user
charges. Betterment levies, special
assessments, developer exactions for
both on site and related off-site
infrastructure.

Infrastructure
services—e.g.,
school
building, hospitals, highways/roads, rail
systems, sewers and sanitation, solid waste
collection, treatment, disposal parks and
recreation entrance. When the service
being charged crosses local jurisdictions
overlapping/coordinating fees and charges
has merit. In some countries there are

Local (SubState)

Further Notes and Illustrations

Benefit Principle
Specific Benefits other than
for infrastructure services.

Infrastructure:
Revenues

Capital

Betterment levies, special
assessments, developer
exactions that may be for
both on-site and off-site
construction

Yes.
When
infrastructure services
cross
state
and
international
boundaries
(e.g.
national roads; water
supply systems).

Local governments in some country levy
“terminal taxes” on goods, vehicles or
passengers entering or leaving
the
jurisdiction.

Infrastructure: Current Flow
of Infrastructure services
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There are two steps to
the revenue sorting out
process: first, identify the
mode to be financed and
funded and, second, the
type of beneficiary tax or
(most likely) fee/charge to
be associated with each
mode.

Illustrations, the application of which will depend on the spatial
matching of the user of the flow of services to the user cost of
operations and maintenance. E.g., school buildings
(tuition);
highways (tolls); airports (taxi service access); parking facilities
(which with new technology can be peak-load priced). S. Africa
levies charges related to the use of electricity, water, sanitation,
and removal of refuse.

multi-jurisdictional joint service districts
and/or multi-state revenue compacts for
which taxes and fees are coordinated and
accessed (Peteri, 2007).

Table. 2 Continued Sorting Out Revenue Authority Among Types of Government: Principles and Applications

Universal Principal/Rationale

Revenue Instrument

Central (FGS)

State (FMS)

Local
State)

Taxes in value added, net
income (profits), and
Gross Receipts.

The key rationale for
Central
government
use of these levies
derives
from there
stabilization
and
distribution roles; not
from application of the
benefits principle.

An
appropriate FMS
tax
handle.
For
simplicity, merit in
conforming (typically
via surcharge) to the
Central Base, if there is
one; apportionment of
the tax base required to
reflect the FMS share of
the total tax base
(which may or may not
be multi-jurisdictional)

Large
cites
may turn to
this
broad
based
taxation;
again
some
form
of
apportioning
of the tax base
is required.

Ethiopia (turnover taxes and a VAT)
Puntland: (i) Agricultural income tax; (ii),
tax on profit from resident industrial,
commercial, vocational activities including.

Resident based tax; tax
compliance simplicity is
promoted if the tax base
conforms with the
center

As economies
become more
advanced,
application of
a
simple
resident
income (e.g.,
wages earned)
has merit

Puntland levies an employer collected tax
on wages and salaries (Pay-as-You-Earn),
and capital gains, as well as income (net of
depreciation)
on real or presumed
income from use of buildings or other
permanent structures. Somaliland levies a
PIT on 6% of gross income and 10% on net
capital gains.

(Sub-

Further Notes and Illustrations

Generalized Benefits
Broad Based Business Taxes

Personal Income Taxes

There are several ways to coordinate a
central VAT with use by SNGs, Bird, 1993;
Lee 92004); Keen, 2005; Le Duncan, 2012).
Building a fiscally capable center need not
require FMSs to abandon their VATs ;
although how its structure may change in
order to harmonize with a central VAT

Table. 2 Concluded. Sorting Out Revenue Authority Among Types of Government: Principles and Applications
Universal Principal/Rationale

Revenue Instrument

Central (FGS)

Property Tax (land and
land and Buildings)

Cooperative federalism
argues that the center
taxes the mobile tax
bases (which SNGs
cannot effectively tax)
and avoid /vacate tax
bases that have then to
have clearly immobile
(e.g. local) character.

State (FMS)

Local (Sub-State)

Further Notes and
Illustrations

Immobility of the Taxable Base
General Revenues

Data shows “subnational” for Land and property taxes in
Puntland and Somalia; (World Bank, 2015); building and fence
(Ethiopia)’ Property Tax (S. Africa); a classified property of
differentiates on types of property(Kenya); state legislative
power and local administration of a property tax (Nigeria)

Ethiopia also has
rental tax on land
and
residential
house;
Puntland
Somaliland an flat
rate tax on rental
income
from
buildings” or other
permanent
structure: oncome
tax on Rwanda on
land lease
.

Single Stage Retail Sales
Tax

In some cases, the base (the value of the sale) is readily
identifiable, if even at the start it entails a rudimentary
collection process (e.g., a common payment window at a
market place where there are receipts or electronic registers).
What will make the tax less workable will be the presence of an
informal “underground” market sector. In this circumstance,
presumptive taxation should be explored.

Excise
(sales)
tax
intermediate
stages
(wholesale,
manufacturing )

Yes on natural resource extraction where (i) royalties can be shared; (ii) a local tax on
real property is in place (there is no a prior reason to exclude any commercial activity,
including natural resource extraction), and (iii) environmental damage is evident.

Note that in the
column to the left in
the box on taxing
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Based on both the benefits and mobility tests, local (sub-state)
governments should have the first-claim on property taxation;
however, there may be a state role if a case can be made that
some state services are particularly well related to property

The taxation of the intermediate transactions of whole sales and manufacturing sales
can be problematic as the tax will be easily avoided by the firm that vertically integrated
with firms operating in the other stages of the extraction , production and distribution
process. Ethiopia SNGs may levies an excise tax on locally manufactured goods and a
turnover tax on services.

Specific Revenues including a
fee or tax that may be
earmarked
for
specific
purposes. Kenya labels these
as Cess Receipts

Special Selected Sales
(Excises) including motor
vehicle and vessel fees
and taxes.

intermediate stages of
production,
natural
resource extraction is
not included. This
revenue
base
is
included
above
(unevenly distributed
tax bases) as a central
revenue.

Livestock

May be central or FMS; or overlapping or shared revenue bases; the tax base
immobility suggests state and local application on livestock and agricultural
products.

Agricultural Products

Overlapping shared/tax bases: Hotel and
other visitor taxes; motor vehicle and
vessel registration; tobacco, alcohol, soft
drinks, bottled water.

Fish

Text: wherever possible, apply specific user
fees and charges. For FMS and its localities,
the matching principle and tax base
mobility meet.

Kenya levies a cess at different
rates on charcoal, livestock, maize,
miraa (Khat), potatoes, sugar cane
and tobacco.

Table 3. Illustrations of Significant Features of Revenue Administration
Country or
Region

Sweden
(unitary)

Non-Revenue Profile
Note

Description

Baseline Somalia

Nascent central government; prospective member states each of which brings with it an own-revenue administration. A
large geographic horn-of-Africa area (44th of 267 countries) but, relative to geographic area, a relatively small population (11 m.
in 2015).

Centralized Model

Centralization may “fit” with size of country, political culture & history, and/or legacy of colonial presence

21 counties (OECD
classified as local
governments)

In Sweden, all taxes are collected by the central government. Regional tax authorities operate under the supervision of the
National Tax Board. Attesting that centralized revenue administration need not imply a lack of decentralized revenue
autonomy, the OECD data show that, due to nearly full discretion that local governments have over setting the local tax rate
at the margin (e.g., “piggybacked” surcharges on central governments), Swedish local governments rank among the most
fiscally decentralized of local governments in OECD member states. A similarly high degree of central revenue administration

but with more restricted local discretion on own-tax rates occurs in the other Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Finland,
Iceland and Norway (JM, 20073; OECD 2011).
Vietnam
(unitary)
Russia
(tight federal)

French West
Africa (unitary)
Cambodia
(unitary)

58 provinces and 5
municipalities

Central administration with tax sharing

21 republics
(oblasts/regions), 46
oblasts, 22 republics
(one of which, Crimea,
is disputed), 4
autonomous okrugs
(districts), 9 kray, 2
federal cities, 1
autonomous oblast.
World’s largest
geographical area.

Although the Russian Constitution reads as an asymmetrical federal system, with respect to tax practice the Russian
Federation is more unitary than federal. Though subnational governments may levy taxes assigned to them—e.g., surcharges
attached to a central tax (e.g., the enterprise profit tax) and local retails sales taxes, subnational governments have no formal
tax administration powers (JM). Taxpayers pay taxes to all governments through the Federal Tax Service. This sometimes
results in under collection of subnational taxes because the Service, as federal body, is interested in primarily collecting the
taxes that accrue to the federal budget (Deryugin and Kurlyandskaya).

Colonial legacy

Generally: countries with limited revenue autonomy, accompanied by limited own-revenue administration; typically
accompanied by tax sharing at the Central government’s discretion.

23 provinces, local
communes, and the
municipality of Phnom
Penh

Minor taxes assigned to provincial governments

Independent Tax Authorities

Australia
(federal)

Six (6) states and two
self-governing
territories
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Each type of government is given the revenue administration role consistent with the taxes assigned to/enacted by each
government. Various coordination mechanisms between or among SNGs may be established (e.g., tax base conformity, joint
audits). This model tends to be associated with medium/large federal countries (MVT, 2010).
Per the national constitution, the federal government solely levies and administers the “major” broad based taxes: (i) customs
and excise duties, and taxes based on (i) value added (tax on goods and service); (ii) individual and corporate net income and
income. Independent state/territorial governments administer payroll taxes and taxes on land transfer taxes. Municipalities
levy and collect the real estate tax, for which the states take on the role of assessment administration (JM, MVT). The
state/territorial/local governments have full own-tax rate setting discretion (OECD, 2011).

Table 3. Illustrations of Significant Features of Revenue Administration, continued
Country or
Region
United States
(loose federal)

Non-Revenue Profile
Note
50 states, s federal
district that has both
state and local fiscal,
89,004 local
governments.

Decentralization of Administration
Germany

(world’s first
parliamentary
federation;
loose federal)

Switzerland

(loose federal)

Description

The US constitution contains no detailed revenue assignments to the federal or state governments other than to vest the federal
government the (i) exclusive authority to tax foreign imports and (ii) concurrent authority (with the states) to levy other
unspecified taxes. No taxes are “assigned” to the states since, as sovereign fiscal entities, state governments possess inherent
plenary tax and tax administration powers. The federal government mainly relies on taxes on income (personal and corporate),
payroll, estates, and various excises. The states independently levy administer taxes on a wide range of taxes on income and
sales. Local governments, which are chartered by the states, rely mainly on real estate taxes, user charges, and, with the
permission of its state, levies on income and sales that may, or may not, piggyback on a state tax base. (Kincaid, 2012).
Moreover, as sovereign entities, they are free to join and jointly administer multijurisdictional special taxing and fee generating
districts for purpose of regulating commerce, and financing and funding of infrastructure modes and schools (EW).
“Sub-Central” revenue administration, typically of all SNG revenues and all or a significant set of central revenues.

16 Länder
(state/province),
11,336 Municipalities,
plus municipal
federations and
counties

German intergovernmental arrangements attest to the practice that in a functioning federal state there often is, but that there
is no a priori reason why there must be, a relationship between revenue autonomy and revenue administration. Tax policy is
fully centrally determined: the constitution assigns revenues from particular taxes to subnational government (thus a firstglance indicator of sub-central revenues as a percent of local revenues suggests Germany is decentralized), and yet the subcentral governments have no discretion over tax rates or other aspects of tax structure (RB, MVT). Thus, with respect to revenue
policy, Germany is the most fiscally centralized of OECD states.(OECD, 2011) However, with the exception of federally
managed and collected customs duties, some excise taxes (e.g., on beer), the VAT on imports and charges imposed within the
framework of the European Union, it is the state/ länder (or, if the lander so delegates, its municipalities) that, subject to broad
federal guidelines (e.g., uniform application of the law), is fully in charged with the role of revenue administration. Not only do
the länders administer almost all German taxes, they also have wide latitude in how to organize their administrative agencies.
(RB).Tax policy is centralized; tax administration is decentralized.

26 Cantons with 2,294
canton dependent
municipalities and in
some cantons further
subdivisions such as
“home right”
communes
(Heimatrecht) and
school districts.

With a history of a (i) loose confederation (a treaty-based system of independent states (1815-1848) to that of a federation
wherein power is shared between the center and constituent/ or member states (1848-present) and (ii) people many of whom
to today still need to be suspect of “creeping centralization”, Switzerland is among the most fiscally decentralized of nations
(Linder, 1994; Dafflon, 2007; OECD, 2011). Reflecting an emphasis on the sovereignty of cantons and communes, the Swiss
Constitution is explicit in a vertical separation of taxing powers: indirect taxation of consumption, excises, and customs du ties
are exclusively central; direct taxes on personal income and wealth and on business income may be levied concurrently by all
types of governments, and each government may have full or partial authority for more than one tax base (MVT). Further
reflecting the Swiss tax culture, the Cantons are responsible for administering their own revenues as well as all direct federal
taxes (MVT).

23 Provinces, 5
autonomous regions 4

The world most populated country (1.4 b 2016) and 4 th in geographic area China by practice has one of the world’s most
decentralized fiscal systems with the central government accounting for only about a fourth of budgetary expenditures (Wong,

China

(unitary)

province level
municipalities, subprovincial prefectures,
counties and towns and
townships.
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2013). It also turns out to be the country in which the tax administration look more like the German and Swiss models and for
which an “astonishingly small central office” relies on a vast network of provincial and local tax offices for tax collecti on.
Indeed, prior to 1994, there was essentially no central tax administration (RB).

Table 3. Illustrations of Significant Features of Revenue Administration, concluded.
Country or
Region

Non-Revenue Profile
Note

Central, Local, and Asymmetric
Bosnia and
Herzegovina

(confederation)

Canada

A central authority with
two “first order”
entities plus an
internationally
supervised district
(Brcko) which is a self
governing unit under
the sovereignty of
Bosnia Herzegovina and
held in condominium
between the two
entities

Established as a confederation in 1995 the “Three Nation State” (FW) of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has a fiscally weak
State of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and two sovereign entities: the Bosniak/Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
the Serb/Bosnian Republika Srpska (RS). The Bosnia War (1992-1995) post-conflict arrangement agreed to by the warring
reflects the decentralized fiscal legacy of Yugoslavia, in which most revenues were raised and retained by the decentralized
republics (BiH, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) that made transfers to fund the federal government.
This “upward” transfer arrangement created considerable budget uncertainty and vulnerability for the federal government
(World Bank, 2015). Distribution on the basis of origin of revenue generated further generated substantial interregional
(horizontal) inequity. With the support of international actors a harmonized customs law was adopted in 1998 followed by
harmonized excise taxes in 2000 and sales taxes in 2001 Agreement on the introduction of a national VAT was reached in the
mid-2000s and implemented on January 1, 2006. With the VAT came the establishment of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Indirect Tax authority. The parties agreed to share VAT revenues on a formula based transfer system that guaranteed shared
revenues to the cantons and municipalities in the Federation and, the municipalities of the Republika Srpska (the Serb
Republic does not have a Canton level of government). One result has been a significant reduction if horizontal fiscal disparities
(World Bank, 2015).

Ten (10) provinces and
3 territories.

Measured as a sub-central taxes as a percent of total tax revenue (49.4%), Canada ranks as the most fiscally decentralized
OECD country (OECD 2011). Inter alia, the provinces are free to determine which SNG tax bases they do, or do not, choose to
adopt (e.g., one province and three territories do not levy a sales tax) and have near full tax rate discretion (one province a nd
three territories do not levy a sales tax). However, Canadian revenue administration is substantially less decentralized than (as
noted below) in China, Germany and the United States (RB, 2015). The federal Canadian Revenue Agency administers
provincial personal income taxes in nine provinces, corporate income taxes in eight provinces, and general sales taxes in five
provinces. Of special importance to note is the asymmetrical system of tax administration. Thus, Quebec administers federal
value-added tax (Goods and Services Tax, GST) on behalf of the federal government, for which the federal government pays a
collection fee to the province (RB, 2015). Income from petroleum operations are separately taxed and administered by the
federal government and the three petroleum based provinces

17 autonomous
communities, “5 Places
of Sovereignty” each of
which is administered
directly by the central
government. This
includes the 2

One will note that in the left column there Spain is not identified as either clearly federal or unitary …it’s just a real mix and
difficult to characterize—a classic case, even more so than Canada, of asymmetrical decentralization (RB). Harty (2005) notes it
is “not a federation…nor is it a state made up of constituent unit…but that it does share many of the institutional features of a
federal state”. The Spanish Constitution recognizes both the “indissoluble unity” and “indivisible country”, yet there are
constitutional provisions that promote aspects of federalism and that for all communities autonomy is a voluntary right (Harty,
SH, JMM). For centuries the communities of Navarra and the Basque Country have had a special political arrangement (fueros),
whereby, inter alia, “tax revenues are and always have been collected at buy the state” the state level (via its three provinces

(loose federal)

Spain

(asymmetrical
federalism)

A mix—and with respect to revenue assignment fiscal policy (but not always revenue administration) special

autonomous cities of
Ceuta and Melilla plus
three small Islands in
the Mediterranean
Alboran Sea.

that make up the state: Nafarroa, Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa).These regions have administrative control over all their revenues an d
all central taxes other than import duties and payroll taxes (RB). Other states have also established their own tax administration
departments. As for the overall degree of state/local fiscal autonomy, on the OECD scale of percent of autonomous tax
revenues as a percent of total government revenues is, perhaps surprising so, falls in the mid-range of fiscal autonomy.

Notes: The shorthand format embedded in the table refer to the following: JM: Mikesell, 2007; MVT: Martinez-Vazquez & Timofeev, 2010: EW: Ebel & Wang, 2017; FW: Fox and Wallace, 2007 .

The profile column draws from the CIA Factbook.
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